February 2025 Retest · ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONAL EXAMPLE

Performance Test: Dawes Family Partnership
Sample Answer & Question Pointers

February 2025 Retest California Bar Examination · Client-letter or memorandum practice using the supplied file and library.

By Bar Exam Doctor · Published November 4, 2026

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This is an original, ungraded instructional response. It is not an official State Bar selected answer, a scored student submission, or a claim of attorney review. Use it to compare reasoning and organization after attempting the question. Alternative reasoned analyses may be possible.

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Official source text with our added highlights and numbered notes. The PDF preserves the source layout. For the PT, the task, file, and substantive library pages appear below; the complete packet includes the instructions and dividers.

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Official source page 15

Jada Robbins & Associates, LLP 43 Franklin Lane Concord, Columbia 99909 MEMORANDUM1 TO: Applicant FROM: Jada Robbins DATE: March 18, 2025 RE: Advice on Partnership for Darnell Dawes Darnell Dawes has asked for our advice on a family business of which he is a partner. Darnell is a partner in the Dawes Family Partnership, which operates several convenience stores in the county in the State of Columbia. The partners in the firm include Darnell, his sister Tiffany Gordon, and his step-father Willie Poole. Dawes and Gordon have had difficulty with Poole’s participation in the business, as described in the transcript of my interview with Dawes. They want to separate Poole from the business if they can. Dawes wants to avoid litigation. So, with Gordon’s agreement, he proposed to Poole that they meet with a mediator to see if they can find a way to settle their differences. Poole agreed. The first mediation session is set for late next week. Dawes wants to know what rights he and Gordon have to force Poole out as a partner. They are prepared to buy him out. In calculating the buyout amount, Dawes also wants to account for several additional contributions he and Gordon have made to the partnership. He wants to know the answers before he starts negotiating with Poole at the mediation session. Prepare a memorandum that assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Dawes’s and Gordon’s claim to force Poole to separate from the business and that discusses the method by which a court would calculate the buyout amount.

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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH DARNELL DAWES Jada Robbins: Darnell, thank you for coming in today. How can I help you? Darnell Dawes: I need to get your advice about a problem with a business I run with my sister. Robbins: What kind of problem are you having? Dawes: We have a partner in the business who we want to move out. We don’t want to do business with him anymore. Robbins: Tell me about the business. When did you start it? Who were the partners? Dawes: We started it about 10 years ago, when my mother was still alive. My mother was looking for something to do after my father died. My sister, Tiffany Gordon, had kids in college and time on her hands. And I was looking to change jobs. So we decided to start a convenience store. Robbins: How did you set up the business? Dawes: As a partnership. We wanted flexibility to change things if we needed to. We signed a partnership agreement. Robbins: How did you finance the business? Dawes: The three of us put in the same amount, to cover initial inventory and operating costs. We rented a space and got started. Robbins: How did it go?

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Dawes: Slow at first, but better after the first six months. After a year, we were breaking even. In the second year, we got ahead. Robbins: Don’t you have more than one store? Dawes: Yes. We opened another store in our third year. We bought the property for the first store and purchased another for the second. Robbins: How did you finance that? Dawes: We borrowed and took out a mortgage on both properties. Again, the three of us split the down payment equally. Robbins: Did things keep going well? Dawes: Yes. In the fifth year, we opened another location, borrowing the money, purchasing the building, and splitting the down payment equally. But then my mother died. Robbins: I am sorry to hear that. What happened with her partnership interest? Dawes: Well, I didn’t say this before. But about four years after the business started, she got married to this man, Willie Poole. When she died, she left her partnership interest to him. Robbins: I gather that you didn’t get along with him. Dawes: Before my mother died, we had no problems. She was happy and that was fine with us. We’d see him at gatherings, but we never got close. Robbins: Okay. After your mother died, what role did Poole play in the business?

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Dawes: None at first. My sister and I did the work. When we needed to put more money in, the two of us paid it. We didn’t ask for his help and he didn’t offer. Robbins: Did he take any money out? Dawes: Yes. He got a monthly payment from the partnership. Same as my mother. Robbins: Did you or your sister take anything out? Dawes: No. We always left our draw in the partnership. Neither of us needed it. My sister’s husband makes a good living and so does my wife. Robbins: So it’s Poole that you want to move out of the business. Why? Dawes: The trouble started about a year ago. Poole started showing up at the stores and criticizing some of our employees. We asked him to stop, but he didn’t. Robbins: Why did he start doing this? Dawes: I don’t know. I heard he had changed jobs and was making less. Maybe he thought the stores could make more money. I never asked. Robbins: So why are you here now? Dawes: About six months ago, Poole got worse. He was authorized to sign checks for the partnership and started buying inventory that wouldn’t sell. He tried to fire an employee that he didn’t like. We persuaded the employee to stay, but we could not get Poole to stop interfering. Robbins: What happened next?

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Dawes: My sister heard about the chance to buy a fourth store, but we had to move quickly. We had the down payment and didn’t need to ask Poole to pay in. But he refused1 to consent to the expansion. He wouldn’t sign the loan papers. He blocked the whole thing. So we lost that chance. Robbins: And then? Dawes: That was it for me and Tiffany. We set up a meeting with Poole and told him we wanted to buy him out. He refused and started yelling at us that we were mismanaging the stores. He threatened to sue us. We don’t know why. We got pretty angry too. It was a mess. Robbins: What happened after that? Dawes: When my sister and I cooled down, we realized that we couldn’t let things stay the way they were. We both want to avoid a court case. So we talked with some friends, who recommended a mediation service offered by the local Better Business Bureau. Poole agreed and we are meeting next Friday. That’s why I contacted you. I want to know how strong a claim we have to force him out. Robbins: Anything else? Dawes: Yes. We’re ready to pay Poole one-third of the current value of the business; we don’t want to fight about shares. But we want the contributions we’ve already made taken out of the total value before the shares are calculated. We think that’s fair, especially since Poole never put in a dime. But it would mean paying him about $50,000 less. Robbins: Got it. A few questions. You and your sister have paid in funds for down payments and for other reasons. Is that right?

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Dawes: Correct. Robbins: And you have taken no money out of the business, correct? Dawes: Yes, that’s right. Robbins: Thank you. We’ll look at the law and get back to you early next week.

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DAWES FAMILY PARTNERHIP AGREEMENT (Selected Paragraphs) . . . . . 7. INITIAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION. The partners hereby agree to make initial capital contributions to the Partnership to be used in the Partnership business. By unanimous1 agreement of all Partners, additional contributions may be made to, or withdrawals may be made from, the capital of the Partnership. 8. SUBSEQUENT CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS. The partners recognize that additional capital contributions may be necessary for future Partnership purposes. The treatment of such contributions may be determined by unanimous agreement of the partners at the time of the contribution. 9. DISTRIBUTIONS. On December 31 of each year, the accounts of the Partnership business will be closed for the year. As of that date, the Partnership income and expenses will be totaled and the difference shall be divided among the Partners on any basis that is mutually agreed upon by all Partners, giving due consideration to services rendered during the year by each Partner, drawings during the year by each Partner, and the amount of capital invested by each Partner during such year. Partners may request their drawing to be paid annually or in monthly installments. . . . . .

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COLUMBIA REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (Selected) Section 23.601. Events Causing Dissociation. A person is dissociated as a partner when: . . . . . (e) on application by the partnership or another partner, the person is expelled as a partner by judicial order because the person: . . . . . (3) has engaged or is engaging in conduct relating to the partnership’s business which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business with the person as a partner . . . . . Section 23.701. Purchase of Interest of Person Dissociated as Partner. (a) If a person is dissociated as a partner without the dissociation resulting in a dissolution and winding up of the partnership business, the partnership shall cause the person’s interest in the partnership to be purchased for a buyout price determined pursuant to subsection (b). (b) The buyout price of the interest of a person dissociated as a partner is the amount that would have been distributable to the person . . . if, on the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold and the partnership were wound up . . . . .

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BATES v. BATES LAND CO. Columbia Supreme Court (2009) This dispute centers on a family owned partnership, Bates Land Company. Kelly Bates is the second of seven children in the Bates family. The other partners include Kelly’s parents and his six siblings. The partnership was formed in the mid- 1990s and owns both ranchland and farmland. On March 26, 2007, the partnership held a meeting to discuss selling a parcel of land. Kelly received notice of the meeting, but did not attend. Later, Kelly refused to sign any documents related to the sale and refused to talk with the other partners. All the other partners filed suit to dissociate Kelly from the partnership. The trial court found that Kelly had engaged in conduct “relating to the partnership’s business which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business” in partnership with Kelly. Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) Section 23.601(e)(3). The trial court ordered dissociation and Kelly appealed. Enacted in 1998, RUPA introduced the concept of “dissociation.” Under prior law, if members of a partnership wanted to expel one of the partners, they had to seek dissolution of the partnership, followed by an accounting and division of shares. By contrast, dissociation permits the expulsion of one partner without completely dissolving the partnership. RUPA Section 23.601 articulates more than ten separate grounds for dissociation, only one of which is at issue in this case. The trial court found that Kelly did not trust the other general partners, including his parents and his other siblings, and that this distrust was mutual. It determined that the relationship between Kelly and the other family members was irreparably broken. The trial court focused on a meeting between the partners in 2006, a year before this lawsuit began. In that meeting, Kelly turned to each of the other partners

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and said to each of them in turn that they would each die, that he would be the last man standing, and that he would then gain control of the partnership. At trial, Kelly contended that this was not a threat, but only a description of the rights of survivorship in the partnership agreement. The trial court determined that Kelly’s statements constituted threats. Kelly also stated to his family that “paybacks are hell” and that he intended to get even with all of them, a statement the trial court also found be a threat. Finally, the trial court noted Kelly’s refusal to sign documents related to the land sale and refusal to speak with the other partners. Kelly’s father had to hire a lawyer to communicate with Kelly. The trial court concluded that the partnership could not operate in any meaningful way with Kelly as a partner. It found that Kelly’s conduct constituted “conduct relating to the partnership business which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business with the person as a partner.” RUPA Section 23.601(e)(3). No previous Columbia case directly addresses this subsection. Accordingly, we look to other jurisdictions for guidance on how to apply this dissociation provision. In Warnick v. Warnick (Wyoming 2003), the court affirmed a trial court order of dissociation against a partner in a family business similar to the one in this case. There had been heated disputes, including physical altercations initiated by the dissociated partner. That partner had also paid personal expenses out of the partnership checking account. The Wyoming Supreme Court found these facts sufficient to support for an order of dissociation. Similarly, in Brennan v. Brennan Associates (Connecticut 2008), the trial court ordered the dissociation of a partner in part because that partner had failed to disclose a prior felony conviction for tax fraud to his other partners. The trial court also noted other conduct of the dissociated partner: efforts to claim sole

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check-signing authority; disputes over the handling of complaints of tenants renting property from the partnership; and claims by the dissociated partner that the other partners had engaged in fraudulent contact – claims the trial court found to be false. The Supreme Court used a totality of the circumstances analysis to find “an irreparable deterioration of a relationship between partners” and affirmed the order of dissociation under that state’s RUPA statute. See also, Nuco Associates v. Jackson (Utah 2004) (dissociation appropriate where partners could not agree on managing partnership affairs and where one partner generated a “toxic atmosphere of acrimony”). We find these authorities persuasive. We recognize that, in many cases, the relationship between partners may still be salvageable. We stress that a dissociation should not be ordered in situations where partners disagree in good1 faith about how to meet the inevitable challenges faced by any business. But we find that conduct similar to that in this case can serve as a basis for dissociation of a partner. A trial court should employ a totality of the circumstances analysis to assess whether the relationship between partners has deteriorated to the point where it is “not reasonably practicable to carry on the business” with one of the partners. Affirmed.

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JOHNSON v. SAMSON, ET AL. Columbia Court of Appeal (2018) Two partners in a printing business, Solomon Samson and Juanita Mason, petitioned the Columbia trial court for an order of dissociation against a third partner, Jarvis Johnson. The petition also stated their intention to buy out Johnson’s interest and proposed a method for valuing that interest. Johnson contested both the dissociation request and the proposed valuation method. The trial court ruled in favor of Samson and Mason on dissociation, but agreed with Johnson on how to value his share. Samson and Mason appealed on the valuation issue alone. The partnership, JoSamCo Printing Company, was formed in August 2012. Each partner contributed equal funds, which were used as a down payment towards the purchase of an existing print shop in Columbia City. The partnership took out a loan for the balance of the purchase price, secured by a mortgage. All three partners worked in the business and shared management responsibilities. For the first three years, the partners contributed equally to the partnership and took equal cash distributions. About three years ago, Johnson began to withdraw from the operation of the business. He stopped contributing regularly to partnership expenses, but continued to receive cash distributions. Over the next two years, the remaining two partners continued to contribute to the business. Specifically, they paid a total of $50,000 in mortgage and operating expenses. Samson also left the amounts designated as his cash distribution in the partnership accounts, which were used to fund limited expansion efforts by the business. Tension between the partners increased, based on Johnson’s refusal to contribute additional funds and his insistence on receiving cash draws. Eventually, Johnson stopped all participation in the business and started a different job in an

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unrelated business. That led Samson and Mason to petition for dissociation. At trial, the parties stipulated to the dates and amounts of all contributions and distributions. The parties also agreed that, if the court ordered dissociation, Samson and Mason would buy out Johnson’s interest. The parties disagreed about how to value that interest. Johnson contended that his share should be calculated based on the gross value of the partnership's assets on the date of dissociation, without regard to any additional contributions by the other partners. Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) Section 23.701. Samson and Mason contended that Johnson’s share should be calculated based on the net value of those assets, determined after deducting the value of contributions they had made. The trial court agreed with Johnson and awarded an amount of money that differed by over $90,000 from the price proposed by the other partners. Resolution of this matter relies on application of the Columbia Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), which states in pertinent part: [A] partnership agreement governs relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership. To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this chapter governs relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership. RUPA Section 23.103(a). As a preliminary matter, we note that the JoSamCo partnership agreement contains no provisions dealing with the treatment of additional contributions by the partners. We thus apply the default provisions of RUPA. Under RUPA, during the existence of the partnership, “[a]ll partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise

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agreed by the claimant or provided by law.” RUPA Section 23.306(a). “A partner may lend money to and transact other business with the partnership,” RUPA Section 23.404(f), and “[a] partnership shall repay a partner who, in aid of the partnership, makes a payment or advance beyond the amount of capital the partner agreed to contribute.” RUPA Section 23.401(d). Such payments or advances constitute loans to the partnership, which accrue interest from the date of the payment or advance. RUPA Section 23.401(e). The partners in this case knew that additional cash would be needed to make the mortgage payments. However, the partners never amended their partnership agreement to address how to account for additional contributions by partners. The advances by Samson and Mason were not documented specifically, either as loans or as capital contributions. The trial court found that the lack of documentation of the advances as loans led to the conclusion that they should be treated instead as capital contributions. It thus declined to deduct them from the gross value of the partnership assets. This conclusion was in error. Nothing in RUPA requires that advances to the partnership be specifically documented as a loan. To the contrary, RUPA evidences a presumption that any additional amounts paid by a partner, over and above initial capital contributions, are to be treated as loans, with interest payable from the date of the contribution. RUPA is unequivocal on this point. The drafters' comment states: “[T]he partnership must reimburse a partner for an advance of funds beyond the amount of the partner's agreed capital contribution, thereby treating the advance as a loan.” In this case, the silence of the partnership agreement on this point, combined with the statutory presumption requiring advances to be treated as loans, requires the conclusion that the advances by Samson and Mason constituted loans to the partnership. Johnson now argues that treating an advance as a loan would allow one partner to dilute the other partners' shares. That

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argument is one for the legislature, which could not have stated more clearly that a partner's share of partnership assets should be assessed only after satisfying all partnership liabilities, including those arising from partner advances. These principles require us to treat all advances made by Samson and Mason as loans. The cash distributions1 that Samson chose to leave in the partnership accounts for use by the partnership also constitute loans to the partnership. His choice to leave them with the partnership was the functional equivalent of another advance to the partnership. Reversed and remanded for recalculation of Johnson’s share as provided in this opinion.

Before you write: issue outline

  1. Write an objective office memorandum for use before mediation.
  2. Compare business impairment with good-faith disagreements under Bates.
  3. Classify each contribution under the agreement and Johnson before valuing a buyout.

Original sample office memorandum

To: Jada Robbins
From: Applicant
Date: March 18, 2025
Re: Dawes Family Partnership—dissociation and buyout

Overview

Dawes and Gordon have a credible, but not conclusive, basis to seek judicial dissociation of Poole. The evidence should show an operationally unworkable relationship, rather than mere resentment that he receives draws or disagrees about expansion. Their strongest buyout argument is that qualifying additional advances and retained distributions are loans payable before the residual interest is divided. Initial and unanimously agreed capital contributions require different treatment.

I. Judicial dissociation

Columbia RUPA section 23.601(e)(3) authorizes judicial expulsion where conduct relating to partnership business makes it not reasonably practicable to continue with the person as a partner. Dissociation can remove a partner while the remaining business continues; it need not require dissolution and sale of every store.

Bates v. Bates Land Co. applies a totality-of-the-circumstances test. It distinguishes an irreparable breakdown impairing operations from good-faith disagreements over ordinary business challenges. Its examples include refusals to communicate or sign necessary documents, false accusations, efforts to seize control, and a toxic atmosphere. The analysis is practical, not a requirement to prove a particular act of violence or theft in every case.

Here, Poole initially accepted payments without participating. More recently he repeatedly criticized employees after being asked to stop, bought inventory that would not sell, attempted to fire an employee the others retained, and blocked the proposed fourth store by refusing the loan documents. The failed buyout meeting ended in accusations of mismanagement and a threatened lawsuit. Taken together, these events support escalating dysfunction affecting personnel, purchasing, financing, and planning.

The blocked expansion is an especially useful comparison to the refused land-sale signatures in Bates. It connects the relationship’s deterioration to a concrete lost business opportunity. The continuing inability to agree on employee supervision also suggests more than a private family quarrel.

There are meaningful weaknesses. Poole had check-signing authority, so buying inventory was not necessarily an unauthorized seizure of control. Poor commercial judgment does not alone establish impracticability. Refusing a new loan can reflect a good-faith objection to expansion, and the file does not establish that his charges of mismanagement were false. Unlike Bates, there are no findings of threats of death, physical altercations, or personal use of company funds. Dawes and Gordon also became angry during the meeting, so the deterioration cannot simply be attributed to Poole without examination.

Poole’s agreement to mediation indicates that communication may still be salvageable. That supports settlement but also gives him an answer to a claim that continued partnership is already impossible. We should document the operational effects, disputed decisions, attempts to resolve them, and the basis for the accusations. A court could order dissociation, but the present record does not make it inevitable. This balanced assessment should inform mediation rather than become an assertion that the siblings can expel him merely by voting together.

II. Buyout valuation

Under section 23.701, a dissociation not resulting in dissolution requires purchase of the departing interest at the amount distributable if the assets were sold and the business wound up on the dissociation date. Dawes and Gordon are willing to use one-third for Poole, so this memorandum does not contest his agreed percentage. That does not make one-third of gross asset value the correct payment.

Johnson v. Samson holds that the partnership agreement controls where it speaks and statutory defaults fill its gaps. Beyond agreed capital, advances are presumptively loans accruing interest from the advance date; a special promissory note is unnecessary. Distributions a partner was entitled to receive but left available to the business can likewise be loans. Partnership liabilities, including those loans, are paid before the residual value is allocated.

The Dawes agreement does address capital. Paragraph 7 requires unanimous agreement for additional capital contributions, and paragraph 8 allows unanimous agreement to determine their treatment. Thus, we must classify each payment rather than apply Johnson to every dollar indiscriminately.

The original equal startup contributions were agreed capital and should not be recast as loans simply to lower Poole’s inherited interest. The equal down payments for the second and third stores, made with the original partners’ participation, may likewise reflect unanimously agreed additional capital. We need the actual agreements and accounts. After the mother’s death, Dawes and Gordon supplied additional money without seeking or obtaining Poole’s contribution or apparent unanimous agreement to capitalize it. Those payments more closely fit Johnson’s default loan treatment, unless contrary agreement or another controlling characterization is established.

Their retained draws also deserve separate credit if they were actually determined and payable under paragraph 9, then left for partnership use. Forgone compensation that never became an agreed distribution is not automatically a loan; the records must establish the entitlement, amount, and dates. Poole’s authorized monthly draws are not debts merely because the others chose to retain theirs.

The accounting should value the assets, deduct outside liabilities such as mortgage debt, repay qualifying partner advances with interest, and allocate the remaining distributable amount using the agreed ownership fractions and applicable capital accounting. No item should be deducted twice as both a mortgage payment and a remaining liability, or as both capital and a partner loan.

Dawes predicts a roughly $50,000 reduction in Poole’s payment, but the file lacks the amounts, dates, interest calculation, current valuation, and full distribution records needed to confirm that figure. Before mediation, we should assemble that schedule and separate clearly established loan credits from disputed capital. The legal position favors reimbursement of qualifying post-capital advances; it does not support an unsupported across-the-board deduction of every historical contribution.

Sources and further comparison

The official question controls its facts and jurisdiction. These responses address the exam scenario; subsequent legal changes and other fact patterns may require a different analysis. The PT uses the supplied fictional Columbia library, which must not be replaced with outside law.