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July 2025 · ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONAL EXAMPLE

Performance Test: Tate v. Tate
Sample Answer & Question Pointers

July 2025 California Bar Examination · Client-letter or memorandum practice using the supplied file and library.

By Bar Exam Doctor · Published November 4, 2026

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This is an original, ungraded instructional response. It is not an official State Bar selected answer, a scored student submission, or a claim of attorney review. Use it to compare reasoning and organization after attempting the question. Alternative reasoned analyses may be possible.

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Official source page 13

The Rhodes Law Firm 43 Whitehall Lane Sparta, Columbia MEMORANDUM TO: Applicant FROM: Roberta Rhodes DATE: July 29, 2025 RE: Advice on a Partition Action for Joan Tate Joan Tate has recently asked for our help acquiring sole ownership of a piece of real property that she owns as a cotenant together with two cousins, Frank Tate and Crystal Tate. She has asked them to sell her their interests as cotenants to her, so that she can develop the property for commercial purposes. Her cousins have refused. They want to continue to use the property as a residence. They have also told her that, if a sale does happen, they will ask that the property be divided into three separate parcels. Finally, Crystal has said that, if the property is sold, she wants to be paid back for her contributions to the property. Ms. Tate has asked us two questions: 1) Can she force a sale of the entire property, or will she be forced to divide the property into three parcels? 2) Will Crystal Tate be able to recover the full amount of her contributions to the property? Please prepare a letter1 to Ms. Tate giving advice about these questions under Columbia’s partition statute. Make sure to address each question separately. In your discussion, identify both the strengths and potential weaknesses of the client’s prospective claim. Integrate the facts into your advice. Use legal terminology only when necessary. Write in a way that someone unfamiliar with legal concepts will be able to understand.

Official source page 14

The Rhodes Law Firm 43 Whitehall Lane Sparta, Columbia MEMORANDUM TO: File FROM: Roberta Rhodes DATE: July 22, 2025 RE: Interview with Joan Tate I met with Joan Tate in our offices today. This memorandum summarizes our conversation. This interview deals with a potential lawsuit against individuals who share Ms. Tate’s last name. So, I will refer to all prospective litigants by their first names. Joan Tate is a 52-year-old resident of Sparta whom I have met several times before. She owns a series of craft stores that cater to the tourist trade and to students at the University in Sparta. She has a reputation for being a successful businessperson and an active participant in various charities. Joan holds an ownership interest as a cotenant in a piece of real estate located in an area zoned for both commercial and residential use. The specific address is 23 Corinth Road. The property consists of a house on a roughly one-acre parcel of land in an area that until recently was primarily residential. As Sparta has grown, more and more houses along Corinth Road have been converted to commercial enterprises. Joan described the area as one suited to smaller businesses such as clothing stores, gift shops, and bookstores. The house sits at the corner of Corinth Road and Sykes Street. It occupies a little less than one-third of the overall parcel and has an adjacent garage. The rest of the land includes a one-third-acre wooded area at the back of the house, abutting Sykes Street. It also includes a one-third-acre parcel of open land next to the house, on Corinth Road. The property is owned by Joan and her two cousins, Frank Tate and Crystal Tate. The three cousins received their cotenancies directly from their grandfather. His death occurred about 10 years ago, when all three cousins were adults. Crystal Tate took occupancy of the house shortly after his death and has lived there continuously since then.

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Joan says that the cousins have never been close. As a result, she knows relatively little about any one of them. What she knows comes from a series of interactions she had with them recently about the property. About a month ago, Joan heard that Crystal was planning to move out of the house. Joan called Crystal and learned that Crystal’s husband had been promoted and would be transferred to a different city within the next six months. Crystal said that she would rent out the house as a residence after she moves. This gave Joan an idea. She toured the neighborhood, talked with several nearby store owners, and consulted with a real estate agent. She became convinced that the house offered business opportunities that would offer a much higher rate of return, either as professional office space or as high-end retail. Joan met with Frank and Crystal to make her proposal. Both rejected the idea out of hand. They said that the house had been in the family as a residence for decades and that it was inappropriate to use it for anything else. In fact, Frank said that, if he had to, he would move his family into the house to keep Joan from “commercializing” it. If Joan forced the issue, Frank and Crystal said they would rather divide the property into three separate parcels. The conversation ended after Crystal pointed out that she had paid about $40,000 in taxes, maintenance, and repairs over the years. Crystal also said that she paid $20,000 to build the garage. Crystal’s parting words to Joan were, “You never paid a cent.” Joan now believes that her cousins will reject any effort on her part to buy them out. Still, she believes that this is an opportunity that she cannot pass up. She respects her cousins’ attachment to the house, but now that Crystal’s family is moving, this is the right time to shift it to a more profitable use. Joan has heard about the possibility of forcing a sale using a partition action. She wants to buy the whole property and does not want to divide it into parcels. She accepts that Crystal has made all of those payments and wants to know whether Crystal can recover them in addition to her share of the property. I told her that we would investigate further and write her a letter with our advice.

Official source page 16

MEMORANDUM TO: Joan Tate File FROM: Kerry Owens DATE: July 28, 2025 RE: Results of Investigation into Partition of Corinth Road Property I was asked to investigate several matters relating to a potential partition action involving the property at 23 Corinth Road in Sparta. Ownership Interests The property is currently owned by Joan Tate, Frank Tate, and Crystal Tate as cotenants. Both the land records and Probate Court records indicate that they received their interests through the will of their grandfather, Simon Tate, upon his death 10 years ago. There have been no liens or mortgage deeds on the property since then. Occupancy, Possession, and Residence A review of the city’s tax records indicates that Crystal Tate has paid the property taxes for the last 10 years. Crystal Tate has listed 23 Corinth Road as her residential address since her grandfather’s death 10 years ago. The total property tax that Crystal has paid over the last 10 years is $30,000. The property has been assessed for residential purposes during that time. Its appraised value has not increased for the last five years. Fair Market Value You asked me to estimate the value of the property both as a whole and after division into three parcels. I consulted with the real estate agent mentioned by Ms. Tate in her interview with Roberta Rhodes and with several other agents whom we have used as experts in the past. The following numbers reflect a consensus of their views. As a Single Parcel: The property has a current fair market value of approximately $600,0001. This figure accounts for the fact that the house sits in a neighborhood that includes both residential and commercial uses. As Separate Parcels: I confirmed that the property could readily be divided into three separate parcels: one parcel on the corner of Corinth Road and Sykes Street that includes

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the house and the garage; a wooded area in back of the house abutting Sykes Street; and open land next to the house on Corinth Road. The house occupies a somewhat smaller area than the two other parcels, which are each roughly equal in size. The value of the parcel with the house and garage comes to roughly $200,000. The combined value of the other two parcels together totals $250,000: $130,000 for the open land next to the house; $120,000 for the wooded lot abutting Sykes Street. The total of the values of the three separate parcels would thus come to approximately $450,000. Cost of Repairs and Improvements Beyond confirming the addition of the garage by Crystal Tate eight years ago, I have no way of cross-checking the $60,0001 figure offered by Crystal Tate. Property taxes for those years come to roughly $30,000; and it seems reasonable to think that she invested an additional $10,000 in repairs and maintenance during this time. My consultants indicate that the garage would have cost an additional $20,000. As a result, the $60,000 total quoted by Crystal seems accurate.

Official source page 20

Mahone v. Donnelly Columbia Supreme Court (2011) This is an appeal from an order directing the partition by sale of 5.7 acres in Liberty County known as the River Farm. Brittany Mahone and Sean Donnelly Jr. own interests as cotenants. The trial court ruled that physical division of the property was not possible and, after affording Mahone the option to buy out Donnelly’s interest, ordered the sale of the property. Mahone appealed; we affirm. The River Farm was acquired by Brittany Mahone’s grandfather, Thomas Mahone, who purchased the land. Thomas Mahone left the property to his two surviving children as cotenants, who shared the use of the property as a vacation property. Each child wrote a will transferring their interest to their surviving children. Brittany Mahone received her share from her father and continued to use it as vacation property. Sean Donnelly purchased his share from the other grandchild, with the purpose of developing the entire property as resort property. Brittany Mahone objected to the development and refused Donnelly’s offer to buy her out. Donnelly then filed this partition action. At trial, Mahone presented testimony from a real estate agent that the River Farm could readily be divided into two parcels of land: one smaller parcel that fronted on the road and included the house, the other a larger parcel that included the river and consisted largely of undeveloped woodland. This testimony assigned roughly equal monetary values to the larger and the smaller parcels, if sold in their current state of development. In her own testimony, Mahone stated her desire to keep the smaller parcel and testified to the importance of the house and surrounding land to her and her family, given its connection to her grandfather and his descendants. On cross-examination, she acknowledged that she would not agree to provide road access to the larger parcel if Donnelly sought to develop it. She also stated that she could not afford to buy Donnelly’s interest from him. Donnelly offered testimony from a real estate agent and a developer that specialized in developing resort properties. These two witnesses offered their opinions that, sold as a single parcel and used for development, the River Farm would have nearly three times the total value of the separate parcels proposed by Mahone. They stated that, if the larger parcel did not include a right of way to the road fronting the larger parcel, the value of the larger parcel would be relatively small, given the lack of ready access to road frontage in any other direction. Donnelly acknowledged on cross-examination that if the court ordered

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a judicial sale of the property, he intended to purchase the entire property at that sale. In Columbia, if cotenants cannot agree on how to divide their co-owned property, one cotenant has the right to file a partition action to compel a division of the property (Columbia Partition Code section 1020). According to the statute, the trial court must order a physical division of the property, unless “physical division would result in economic1 harm to the parties or is otherwise impracticable” (Id. section 1025). This provision creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of physical division, which may be rebutted in at least two ways. First, the presumption may be overcome by proof that any one parcel out of the divided property would have little to no economic value, (Timmons v. Warnes, Columbia Court of Appeal (2002)). Second, the presumption may be overcome by proof that the market value of the property as a whole would be significantly larger than the total value of all parcels after division. Stated differently, proof that the value of the land as a whole would be diminished by division into separate parcels would rebut the presumption (Quick v. Scartz, Columbia Court of Appeal (2008)). Our courts have also addressed the role of sentiment and familial attachment in partition cases. The cases recognize that individuals and families can develop a strong attachment to land on which a family resides and which has been received by inheritance. These considerations support an order for physical division, especially where family members continue to use some or all of the land as a primary residence. However, “while sentimental considerations should have great weight, especially in the preservation of a home, considerations of economic value should be the determining factor” (Id.). In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the sale and the division of the proceeds equally between the parties. Sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court’s finding that, sold as one parcel, the River Farm would have significantly greater value than the total value of the separate parcels if physically divided. Credible testimony existed that the value of the larger, undeveloped parcel would have slight value, especially in light of Mahone’s expressed unwillingness to provide a right of way. Finally, without questioning Mahone’s testimony about her family’s attachment to the house and land, her family does not use the house as a primary residence. Even if it did, the trial court acted within its discretion in according greater weight to the economic advantages of selling the property as one parcel. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Official source page 22

Boyd v. Boyd Columbia Court of Appeal (1994) Plaintiff, Douglas Boyd, brought this action to partition real estate held by himself and his sister, Patricia Boyd, as tenants in common. The real estate consists of a dwelling and four acres of land in Oceanside, Columbia (the Oceanside property). During the partition action, Patricia sought to be reimbursed for expenditures she made for maintaining the property while living there for seven years before the court divided the proceeds from the sale of the property. The trial court granted her request. Douglas appealed this decision. We affirm. The parties’ mother, Florence Boyd, owned the Oceanside property, having inherited it from her husband in 1979. Until 1982, Florence Boyd lived in the property alone. In 1982, her health began to decline, and Patricia Boyd moved into the property to help her mother and to reduce her living expenses after her divorce the year before. Douglas Boyd continued to live in California and did not contribute to the upkeep of the house or land. In 1984, Florence Boyd executed a will that left Patricia Boyd a small sum “in recognition of her services to me” and that left the Oceanside property to Patricia and Douglas Boyd as cotenants. She left the balance of her estate, roughly $50,000, to charity. Florence Boyd died in 1985. Patricia remained in the property and continued to work in Oceanside. Douglas stayed in California. He and his sister spoke infrequently. He continued to make no contributions to the property. In 1992, Douglas Boyd experienced several financial setbacks. He asked his sister to buy him out of the cotenancy for the price of $200,000, half of the property’s fair market value. Patricia could not afford to do so; she refused. Douglas then filed this partition action. After an independent appraisal, the trial court confirmed a fair market value of $400,000. Patricia offered uncontested evidence that she had spent $25,000 to maintain the house between 1975 and 1992. She also offered that she had expended $5,000 on the construction of a tool shed at the back of the house. The court combined these two amounts and ordered that Patricia receive one half of that total from the proceeds of sale, before dividing the balance equally between the parties. On appeal, Douglas contended that this order was in error. At common law, a cotenant who paid more than her share of the costs of maintaining the co-owned property could bring an action for contribution from the other cotenants. Where one cotenant assumes all of these costs, that cotenant could bring an action against the other cotenants for the amount by which those costs exceeded the tenant’s share. This common law principle rests on the equitable doctrine of contribution between joint obligors

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(Pomeroy v. Kent, Columbia Supreme Court (1906)). All cotenants share equally in the obligation to maintain the property they own. If one cotenant bears the full costs, the others can be compelled to contribute their share of those costs. Nothing in the current Columbia partition statute alters this principle. To be sure, the language of the statute makes no explicit provision for deducting those costs from the proceeds of a forced sale: “The court shall order the proceeds of the sale to be divided among the several claimants in proportion to their respective interests after deducting the expenses of the proceedings” (Columbia Partition Code, section 1044). However, the statute also provides that the court “may frame its proceeding and order so as to meet the exigency of the case” (Id., section 1050). Our cases have consistently noted that the trial court has the equitable power to satisfy one cotenant’s right of contribution from other cotenants by deducting costs before dividing the remaining proceeds of sale. Patricia Boyd proved that she had expended $25,000 to maintain the property between 1985 and 1992. All of these costs fall within the categories of expenditures previously approved by the courts of this state: for costs of routine maintenance1, see Frome v. Snopes (Columbia Supreme Court (1957)) (deduction for costs of termite removal); for real estate taxes, Jarndyce v. Sutpen (Columbia Supreme Court (1966)) (deduction for share of real estate taxes); and for storm and other catastrophic damage to the house, Trillian v. Trillian (Columbia Court of Appeal (1989)) (deduction for damage caused by forest fire). Patricia is not, however, entitled to the entire $25,000. A cotenant seeking contribution may only obtain credit for the share of the total costs that the other cotenants should have borne. In this case, Patricia Boyd concedes that she and her brother have equal shares as cotenants. She has an obligation as cotenant to bear half of the total costs of maintaining the property. She may seek contribution from her brother only for his half of those costs. The same cannot be said of the $5,000 she spent on the tool shed. Our cases have consistently held that a cotenant who makes improvements to the property cannot recover the costs of the improvements through contribution. These improvements serve only to add to the value of the property, from which the cotenant receives a share in the event of a later sale. Remanded for recalculation of Patricia’s share consistent with this opinion.

Before you write: issue outline

  1. Write the requested client letter using the supplied Columbia authorities.
  2. Compare $600,000 as a whole with $450,000 in three parcels.
  3. Distinguish necessary expenses from improvement costs and allocate only others’ shares.

Original sample client letter

July 29, 2025

Dear Ms. Tate:

You asked whether you can require sale of the Corinth Road property as one parcel and whether Crystal can recover all $60,000 she says she spent. You have a meaningful argument for a sale of the whole property, although a judge must consider your cousins’ interests. Crystal’s claim should be divided between necessary expenses and the garage improvement; the two are treated differently.

1. Can you require a sale of the entire property?

Columbia Partition Code section 1020 allows a co-owner to seek partition—a court-supervised separation of the owners’ interests. That does not automatically mean a sale. Section 1025 initially favors physically dividing the property unless division would be impracticable or cause the required economic harm. Under Mahone v. Donnelly, a court considers whether a proposed parcel would have little or no value, or whether selling the property together would produce significantly more than selling the separate parcels.

Your strongest evidence is the valuation. The whole property is worth approximately $600,000. The proposed house-and-garage parcel is worth $200,000, the open parcel $130,000, and the wooded parcel $120,000. Those parcels total $450,000. Dividing the property would therefore sacrifice approximately $150,000, or one quarter of the whole-property value. That is a concrete economic reason to seek a sale; it is stronger than simply saying you prefer commercial development.

There are weaknesses. The land can readily be divided into three usable parcels, and each would have road access and substantial value. In Mahone, the whole was worth roughly three times the combined divided parcels, and one parcel lacked practical access. Our loss is significant but less dramatic, so the decision does not guarantee the same outcome.

Family attachment also matters. Crystal has lived there for ten years, and the property came from your grandfather. Mahone gives considerable weight to an owner’s attachment, especially to a home. Nevertheless, it makes economic value controlling when the required showing is made; attachment is not an absolute veto. Crystal’s plan to move and rent the house, and Frank’s possibility of moving in, should be addressed candidly. They explain your cousins’ continuing interest but are less direct than an established plan to remain in a lifelong home.

I would recommend obtaining support for the appraisals, proposed parcel layout, and permissible development uses before proceeding. On these facts, you have a substantial claim that the $150,000 loss justifies a sale, but we should prepare for the physical-division and family-home arguments.

An order selling the entire property would not automatically make you its sole owner. You would need to purchase the others’ interests by agreement or acquire the property through the authorized sale process. Other purchasers may participate. The difference between obtaining a sale and obtaining sole ownership is important to your plans.

2. Must you repay all of Crystal’s expenditures?

Boyd v. Boyd distinguishes necessary ownership expenses from improvements. A co-owner who pays more than her share of necessary taxes, maintenance, and repairs can seek contribution from the others. Crystal’s claimed $30,000 in taxes and $10,000 in maintenance and repairs potentially qualify. We should verify the payments and whether the claimed work was reasonably necessary.

Crystal must bear her own ownership share. Assuming the three cousins hold equal interests, her share of $40,000 is approximately $13,333.33. The other two shares total approximately $26,666.67; your individual share would be approximately $13,333.33. The deed and accounting should confirm the fractions before those numbers are treated as final.

Crystal’s $20,000 garage expense is different. Boyd does not give a co-owner an automatic contribution claim for the cost of a unilateral improvement. A beneficial improvement can affect the property’s value and therefore the proceeds available to the owners, but cost is not the same as enhanced value. She cannot simply add the entire garage bill to your required payment. We should request any agreement authorizing the work and evidence concerning its effect on value before resolving that issue.

The final accounting must avoid charging you twice. If the other owners are charged their respective shares of necessary expenses, Crystal receives the corresponding credits. Deducting only the $26,666.67 contribution from the common sale proceeds and then dividing what remains would make her bear part of that adjustment again and understate her reimbursement. The accounting should accurately reimburse the amounts borne for the other owners and then distribute proceeds according to ownership, subject to sale costs and any other established adjustments.

In practical terms, we can seek a whole-property sale while recognizing a properly documented contribution claim for necessary expenses. We should contest automatic reimbursement of the garage’s full cost and use verified ownership and expense records to calculate your actual share.

Sincerely,
Roberta Rhodes

The signature above is part of the fictional examination response, not a claim of review by a real attorney.

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The official question controls its facts and jurisdiction. These responses address the exam scenario; subsequent legal changes and other fact patterns may require a different analysis. The PT uses the supplied fictional Columbia library, which must not be replaced with outside law.

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