February 2025 · ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONAL EXAMPLE

Performance Test: Jamison v. Sunrise Ladder
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February 2025 California Bar Examination · Client-letter or memorandum practice using the supplied file and library.

By Bar Exam Doctor · Published November 4, 2026

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Official source page 15

WILLIAMS & O’BRYANT, LLP 121 Spring Valley Drive Columbia City, Columbia MEMORANDUM TO: Applicant FROM: Julie Williams DATE: February 25, 2025 RE: Jamison v. Sunrise Ladder Co., Inc. Our firm represents Mrs. Valerie Jamison, the widow of Bruce Jamison, in this wrongful death and products liability suit against the Sunrise Ladder Co., Inc. (Sunrise). On February 25, 2024, Mr. Jamison was working near the top of a 36-foot extension ladder when the metal extension supports, known as “rung locks,” gave way, causing Mr. Jamison to plunge to the ground. He suffered severe head injuries, which ultimately led to his death. In the lawsuit we filed in April 25, 2024, against Sunrise, the manufacturer of the ladder, we allege that the rung locks contained a manufacturing defect, causing them to malfunction on the day of Mr. Jamison’s death. However, Advanced Testing, LLC, a testing company hired by Sunrise to examine the ladder, destroyed the rung locks before they could be examined by our expert, Professor Juan Hernandez. I would like you to prepare a letter1 to Mrs. Jamison addressing the following two questions: 1. First, can she obtain a default judgment or other sanctions against Sunrise, based on its failure to preserve the allegedly defective rung locks? 2. Second, can she bring an independent tort action against Advanced Testing based on its destruction of the rung locks?

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DEPOSITION OF STEVEN MITCHELL October 25, 2024 JULIE WILLIAMS: Good afternoon, Mr. Mitchell. My name is Julie Williams. I represent Valerie Jamison in a wrongful death and products liability case against Sunrise Ladder Company. STEVEN MITCHELL: Good afternoon. WILLIAMS: Mr. Mitchell, are you the owner of the Reliable Roofing Company? MITCHELL: Yes, that’s right. I’ve owned the company for over 25 years now. WILLIAMS: Was Bruce Jamison one of your employees? MITCHELL: Yes, Bruce was one of our best roofers. WILLIAMS: How long did Mr. Jamison work for your company? MITCHELL: He had been with us for nearly 10 years when he had his accident. WILLIAMS: Can you tell me what happened on the day of Mr. Jamison’s accident? MITCHELL: Well, I’m still sort of confused about it myself. Bruce was up near the top of one of our tall ladders, working on the edge of a roof on a two-story house. All of a sudden, we heard this loud crashing sound. The ladder had collapsed on itself, and Bruce was on the ground. It was just terrible. WILLIAMS: What do you mean when you say that the ladder had collapsed on itself?

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MITCHELL: I’m sorry, let me try to explain it to you better. This was one of our 36-foot extension ladders. An extension ladder is really two ladders that are connected together with a rope and pulley system. To extend the ladder to its full height, you pull the rope and the one ladder rises up above the other, sort of like a telescope extending. When you get the ladder up to its desired height, two metal locking devices drop over the ladder rungs and hold it in place. Those metal locking devices are called “rung locks” in the industry. WILLIAMS: So, when you say the ladder collapsed, what happened? MITCHELL: It seems like the rung locks gave out for some reason. They were both all mangled and broken, and the top ladder slid down to the ground. WILLIAMS: What did you do with the ladder after Mr. Jamison’s accident? MITCHELL: The ladder was still under warranty, since it was less than a year old. I called Sunrise Ladder Company – that’s the manufacturer – and they instructed me to ship it back to them for repairs. WILLIAMS: And did you do that? MITCHELL: Yes. We packed it up and shipped it to them. WILLIAMS: Did Sunrise repair the ladder? MITCHELL: Yes. It was only about two weeks later that Sunrise shipped the ladder back to us. They replaced the rung locks with new ones, and they put a new rope on the pulley system too. WILLIAMS: What happened to the broken rung locks? Do you know?

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MITCHELL: No, I don’t know. They didn’t send them back to us. I was just happy to get my ladder repaired so I could get it back into service. It’s one of my tallest ladders, and those are pretty expensive items. WILLIAMS: I understand that Mrs. Jamison filed a workers’ compensation case against your company in connection with Mr. Jamison’s death. Is that correct? MITCHELL: Yes, that’s right. WILLIAMS: When was that case filed? MITCHELL: Just two weeks after the accident. WILLIAMS: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. Those are all the questions I have.

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HANSEN, YEE & SOOD, LLP 46 Boulder Creek Road Columbia City, Columbia November 25, 2024 Julie A. Williams, Esq. Williams & O’Bryant, LLP 121 Spring Valley Drive Columbia City, Columbia Re: Jamison v. Sunrise Ladder Co., Inc. Dear Ms. Williams: I am writing in response to your request that your expert witness, Professor Juan Hernandez, be permitted to inspect the metal rung locks that were in place on the extension ladder allegedly being used by Mr. Bruce Jamison at the time of his accident on February 25, 2024. As you already know, Reliable Roofing Company sent the ladder to our client, Sunrise Ladder Co., for warranty service on March 25, 2024. Sunrise replaced the rung locks on the ladder and promptly returned it to Reliable Roofing. Sunrise then shipped the damaged rung locks to an outside testing lab, Advanced Testing, LLC, which conducted an inspection and further evaluation of the damaged rung locks. Unfortunately, several of the tests conducted by the lab were destructive in nature (including cross sections and chemical tests), and Advanced Testing disposed of the remnants of the rung locks after the tests were complete. The results of the testing were inconclusive, and Advanced Testing was unable to determine whether the condition of the rung locks might have contributed to Mr. Jamison’s accident in any way. As a result, Sunrise Ladder Co. is unable to produce the rung locks for inspection by Professor Hernandez. We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause you. Very truly yours,

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Frederick R. Yee FREDERICK R. YEE

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DEPOSITION OF DR. SAMUEL STEIN December 24, 2024 JULIE WILLIAMS: Good morning, Dr. Stein. SAMUEL STEIN: Good morning. WILLIAMS: I’m one of the attorneys representing Valerie Jamison in the action against Sunrise Ladder Company, arising out of the death of her husband, Bruce Jamison. STEIN: Nice to meet you. WILLIAMS: Dr. Stein, you’re employed by Advanced Testing, LLC. Is that correct? STEIN: Yes, that’s right. WILLIAMS: What is your position there? STEIN: I’m the chief scientist in the Failure Analysis Group. WILLIAMS: How long have you worked in that position? STEIN: I’ve been the chief scientist for 10 years. Before that, I was a staff scientist in the department for over 12 years. WILLIAMS: Were you asked to examine a pair of metal locking devices, called rung locks, from an extension ladder sent to you by Sunrise Ladder Company in March 25, 2024? STEIN: Yes, I was.

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WILLIAMS: Can you explain what your examination consisted of? STEIN: First, I performed a visual examination of the rung locks and took several photographs of them. WILLIAMS: How did the rung locks appear to you? STEIN: Both devices were badly damaged. They were severely bent, and one was broken nearly in half. WILLIAMS: And what did you do next? STEIN: Next, I conducted several standard tests. I cut cross sections out of both rung locks for examination under the electron microscope, and I subjected other pieces of both rung locks to tensile strength testing and chemical tests. WILLIAMS: Dr. Stein, what did you conclude as a result of those tests? STEIN: My results were inconclusive. The rung locks were so badly damaged when we received them that I was unable to determine with any degree of certainty why they might have failed. I could not rule out the possibility that the ladder was being misused by its owner. WILLIAMS: Where are the rung locks today? STEIN: We disposed of them after our testing was complete. WILLIAMS: You disposed of them? STEIN: Yes.

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WILLIAMS: Why didn’t you keep the rung locks in case someone else wanted to see them? STEIN: We weren’t asked to do that by Sunrise. Besides, there wasn’t much left of the items after I completed my testing. WILLIAMS: Don’t you normally keep samples of the materials you test, like the cross sections you said you took, to back up your report? STEIN: No, not unless the client makes a special request. We can’t keep everything. We don’t have enough storage space at our facility. WILLIAMS: And Sunrise didn’t ask you to return the rung locks to them when you were finished with your evaluation? STEIN: No, they did not. In fact, as I recall, they specifically instructed us not to return them, but to destroy1 them. WILLIAMS: When Sunrise sent the rung locks to you for testing, did they tell you that a person died in a ladder accident when those rung locks failed? STEIN: No, we were not informed of that. I didn’t find out about the accident until much later. WILLIAMS: Do you recall when you did learn about Mr. Jamison’s accident? STEIN: I only learned about it a few weeks ago, when I received a subpoena to appear for this deposition. I was sad to learn that the gentleman died. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Dr. Stein. Those are all the questions I have for you right now.

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Sabrina Brown v. Waldrop Truck Leasing Corp. Columbia Court of Appeal (2015) Plaintiff Sabrina Brown (“Brown”) brought this action for the death of her husband, Andrew Brown, in an accident in which he was driving a tractor-trailer leased from Defendant Waldrop Truck Leasing Corp. (“Waldrop”). Brown filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against Waldrop based on spoliation of evidence. In her motion, Brown argued that she was entitled to a default judgment because Waldrop disposed of the remains of Mr. Brown’s truck before she or her experts could examine it. The trial court found that, while Brown may be entitled to some relief against Waldrop, a default judgment was inappropriate; instead, the court imposed the lesser sanction of instructing the jury that it may infer that the evidence at issue was unfavorable to Waldrop if it finds that Waldrop’s decision to dispose of the evidence was made for an improper purpose. At the request of both parties, the order has been certified for appeal prior to trial. Background On April 3, 2011, Andrew Brown picked up a 2010 Freightliner semi-truck from a Waldrop location in Ridgedale, Columbia. His employer, Corporate Logistics, Inc., had leased the truck for Mr. Brown while Corporate Logistics’ own truck was being repaired. On April 5, Mr. Brown was driving the rented truck on Interstate 80 when he lost control of the truck and ran off the roadway. The truck burst into flames and Mr. Brown died at the scene. Waldrop was notified of the accident the following day when it received a notice from the Columbia State Police, demanding that the truck be removed from the accident scene within 24 hours. On April 7, Waldrop had the burnt remains of the truck taken to a salvage yard. After paying storage fees for almost 20 months, Waldrop eventually had the truck cab and its trailer crushed and recycled in late December 2012.

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On March 30, 2013, just less than two years after her husband’s death, Mrs. Brown filed this action against Waldrop for negligent repair and maintenance, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty. She then requested that Waldrop allow her expert to examine the truck, whereupon she was informed that the truck had been salvaged a few months before the lawsuit commenced. Mrs. Brown subsequently filed her motion for a default judgment, resulting in the trial court’s order giving rise to this appeal. Analysis We have long acknowledged the broad discretion of trial courts to impose sanctions. This power derives from a court’s inherent power to manage its own affairs and to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Sanctions for discovery abuses are intended to prevent unfair prejudice to litigants and to ensure the integrity of the discovery process. Default represents the most severe sanction available to a court against a defendant, and therefore should only be exercised where there is a showing of bad faith1 and where lesser sanctions will not suffice. According to Columbia law, spoliation of evidence may warrant the imposition of sanctions. In considering whether sanctions are warranted, the court must consider: (1) whether the party moving for sanctions was prejudiced as a result of the destruction, alteration, or non-preservation of the evidence; (2) whether the prejudice could be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the party responsible for the destruction, alteration, or non- preservation acted in good faith or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if testimony about the evidence is not excluded. As sanctions for spoliation, courts may dismiss a case in its entirety against a plaintiff or enter a default against a defendant, exclude expert or other testimony concerning the evidence, or impose a jury instruction on spoliation of evidence that raises a presumption against the spoliator.

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Here, based on its review of the circumstances and its balancing of the foregoing factors, the court imposed the least restrictive sanction: an adverse jury instruction. The trial court expressed little doubt that Brown was prejudiced as a result of the truck’s destruction. She and her experts did not have an opportunity to examine the truck to evaluate its condition after the fire. They could not attempt to determine what caused Mr. Brown to lose control or why the truck immediately burst into flames. They could not examine any safety systems installed on the truck. For these reasons, direct examination of the truck’s condition was critically important to this case. Spoliation of the vehicle will force Brown’s experts to use less reliable evidence, including maintenance records; the accident report, including numerous photographs taken at the scene by the State Police; and eyewitness testimony regarding the accident. Nevertheless, the court focused on the apparent lack of bad faith on the part of Waldrop. In particular, the court noted that the police gave Waldrop only 24 hours to remove the truck from the accident scene, forcing it to make a rushed decision about where to take the burnt remains of the truck. Waldrop then paid storage fees to the salvage yard for almost two years before finally allowing the truck to be destroyed. The court also noted that Brown had yet to express any plans to file an action when the truck was eventually crushed and recycled. We cannot say that the lower court abused its discretion in reaching its decision to impose an adverse jury instruction as a sanction for spoliation. AFFIRMED.

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Zubul v. Standard Motors Corporation Supreme Court of Columbia (2019) Mark Zubul filed this products liability action claiming a manufacturing defect against Standard Motors Corporation, alleging that the braking system in a 2012 Zephyr automobile he was driving malfunctioned, causing him to crash into a utility pole and suffer severe injuries. The car, which was owned by Zubul’s aunt, was repaired before Standard Motors had an opportunity to inspect it. After many months of protracted litigation, Standard Motors filed a motion for sanctions against Zubul based on the unavailability of the car. Standard Motors also sought sanctions against Zubul’s aunt, Christine Simpson, based on her handling of the car; in the alternative, Standard Motors sought leave to bring an independent tort action for spoliation against Simpson. The trial court granted Standard Motors’ motion for sanctions and dismissed Zubul’s action against the company; however, it denied Standard Motors’ request for relief against Simpson. The Court of Appeal affirmed. We granted review. Factual Background On September 14, 2015, Mark Zubul was involved in a single vehicle crash in Rocky Point, Columbia. Zubul was driving his aunt’s 2012 Zephyr automobile while intoxicated and was traveling at an excessive rate of speed. The vehicle crashed through a fence and continued onward for another 50 yards before striking a utility pole. Zubul sustained severe injuries to his face and both arms. He contends that, had the braking system operated properly, he would not have sustained these injuries. Zubul then filed his products liability action against Standard Motors based on a defective braking system on November 2, 2015. Soon after the case commenced, Standard Motors served discovery requests on Zubul, demanding that he produce any photographs of the damaged car and all records relating to its repair. Standard Motors also requested to inspect

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the car. Christine Simpson, the owner of the car, refused to produce it for inspection. During a deposition in Zubul’s case, Simpson testified that she did not report the accident to her insurance company. Instead, she acknowledged that she hired a body shop to repair the damage to the front end of the car, and that she specifically requested that no photographs or other records be made of the damage to the vehicle. Simpson also admitted that she paid her mechanic to install new brake pads and rotors on the car’s front and rear braking systems. She confirmed that the repairs were complete within three weeks after Zubul’s accident, prior to the time he filed his civil action against Standard Motors. Based on Simpson’s testimony, the trial court declined to grant a motion by Standard Motors to compel the inspection of the car, since it was in the custody and control of a third person who was not a party to the underlying action. Standard Motors then filed its motion to dismiss Zubul’s action due to its inability to inspect the car. The trial court granted that motion, having determined that the car was “an important piece of evidence in the case,” which alleged a manufacturing defect, and finding dismissal to be the appropriate sanction for the spoliation of evidence, as a result of the undue prejudice to Standard Motors. Standard Motors also filed a motion against Simpson: It sought sanctions against her for spoliation, based on her allegedly surreptitious repairs to the vehicle and refusal to make it available for inspection; in the alternative, it sought leave to bring an independent tort action against her for spoliation. The trial court denied sanctions on the ground that Simpson was not a party to the suit, and denied leave to bring an independent tort action for spoliation on the ground that Columbia does not recognize such an action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court on both counts. Standard Motors’ Motion as to Zubul “Spoliation” refers to the destruction, alteration, or non-preservation of evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. A trial court has broad discretion to impose sanctions based on spoliation of evidence, as the Court of

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Appeal stated in Brown v. Waldrop Truck Leasing Corp. (Col. Ct. App., 2015), based on its “inherent power to manage its own affairs and to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Courts are empowered to fashion appropriate sanctions for conduct that disrupts the judicial process, including dismissal of a plaintiff’s action. However, the applicable sanction should be molded to serve the preventative, punitive, and remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine. In addition—a point not expressed in Brown—a court must find some degree of fault1 to impose sanctions. We have recognized that when imposing sanctions, the trial court has discretion to pursue a wide range of responses, both for the purpose of leveling the evidentiary field and for the purpose of sanctioning the improper conduct. But dismissal should be avoided if a lesser sanction will perform the necessary function. Here, although Zubul argued that he had no duty to preserve the car in its damaged condition and was not involved in its “surreptitious” repair, the court nevertheless dismissed his action against Standard Motors because it found undue prejudice to Standard Motors’ ability to defend against the products liability claim. We disagree with the Court of Appeal and believe that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions against Zubul. Crucially, at the very threshold, the court failed to consider whether Zubul was at fault for the destruction, alteration, or non-preservation of any evidence. In addition, the court failed to properly balance the relevant factors, including the importance of the evidence and any prejudice to Standard Motors resulting from its destruction. Although the court found that the car was an important piece of evidence, it also failed to consider numerous other potential sources of evidence such as testimony from the repair person, any forensic crash scene reconstruction conducted by the police, and the continued availability of the car.

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Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of Zubul’s action and remand for further proceedings. Standard Motors’ Motion as to Simpson The trial court denied Standard Motors’ motion with respect to Simpson based on its determination that she was not subject to sanctions as a non-party to the action and because Columbia law does not authorize an independent tort action for spoliation of evidence. The Court of Appeal affirmed. We agree that a third party like Simpson is not subject to sanctions for spoliation of evidence. By definition, a third party is not a party to the action within which sanctions are sought and, as such, cannot be made to shoulder its burdens. In contrast, we disagree that Columbia law does not authorize an independent tort action for spoliation of evidence. We hold that it does. When a third party destroys, alters, or fails to preserve evidence, a party to an action who is injured by any wrongful conduct on its part does not have the benefit of remedies available within the action itself. The absence of an independent tort action would conflict with our policy of providing a remedy for every wrong and compensating victims of wrongful conduct. It is generally agreed that recognizing an independent tort action for spoliation of evidence is problematic, absent some type of affirmative duty to preserve the evidence and not to destroy or alter it. However, there is no such general duty. An additional problem arises where the evidence in question is the property of the alleged third-party spoliator. A property owner normally has the right to control and dispose of his property as he sees fit. The owner may legitimately question whether a party to an action in which the owner is not involved has any right to direct control over the owner’s property, and individual autonomy is a heavy factor in favor of the owner.

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We therefore hold that a duty to preserve evidence and not to destroy or alter it may arise in a third party only where a party to an action can establish the existence of some special relationship or obligation arising by reason of a statute, rule, contract, voluntary action, or other similar circumstance. Further, the third party must have actual knowledge1 of the pending or potential action. Accordingly, although we affirm the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of the trial court’s denial of sanctions against Simpson, we reverse its affirmance of the trial court’s denial of leave to bring an independent tort action for spoliation of evidence against Simpson and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.

Before you write: issue outline

  1. Deliver a client letter answering sanctions and the independent tort separately.
  2. Use Zubul’s fault threshold before balancing Brown’s five factors.
  3. Distinguish Sunrise’s destruction instruction from the laboratory’s knowledge.

Original sample client letter

February 25, 2025

Dear Mrs. Jamison:

You asked what we can do about the destruction of the ladder’s rung locks. We have a substantial basis to request sanctions against Sunrise. A judgment in your favor without a trial is possible, but it is the most severe remedy and cannot be promised. A separate lawsuit against Advanced Testing faces a different problem: the present record does not establish the laboratory’s knowledge of your potential case or an obligation to preserve the parts for you.

1. Sanctions against Sunrise

Destroying, altering, or failing to preserve evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation is called spoliation. In Zubul v. Standard Motors, Columbia’s Supreme Court held that a court must find some fault by the party to be sanctioned. The court cannot punish a party solely because someone else destroyed useful evidence.

Sunrise cannot easily distance itself from the loss as Zubul could from his aunt’s conduct. Sunrise received the damaged ladder, retained the original rung locks after repairing it, selected the testing company, and, according to Dr. Stein, specifically directed that the remnants be destroyed rather than returned. That instruction is evidence of Sunrise’s own responsibility, not merely conduct by an unrelated third party.

We must still establish when litigation was reasonably foreseeable to Sunrise. The ladder failed in a fatal accident, and a workers’ compensation claim followed soon afterward. Those circumstances support foreseeability if Sunrise knew them. However, a claim against the employer does not automatically prove Sunrise knew of that claim, and the exact timing of testing, destruction, notice, and the April product lawsuit needs clarification. We should obtain the testing instructions and communications rather than assume every event occurred after suit was filed.

Once fault is established, Brown v. Waldrop identifies five considerations. First, you suffered serious prejudice: our expert cannot directly inspect the components alleged to have failed. Second, the loss cannot fully be cured, although photographs, test records, eyewitness testimony, the repaired ladder, and examination of comparable components may reduce the prejudice. Third, the rung locks are practically central to a manufacturing-defect claim. The laboratory’s inconclusive result does not prove your expert could have learned nothing.

Fourth, bad faith must be assessed. Sunrise’s affirmative destruction instruction is more troubling than Waldrop’s decision to stop paying storage charges after nearly twenty months. Still, Sunrise may argue that it commissioned ordinary scientific testing, obtained no conclusive result, and followed routine disposal practices. Destructive testing alone does not establish a plan to hide a defect.

Fifth, there is a risk of unfair use if Sunrise presents its own expert’s conclusions or a misuse theory while denying our expert any equal opportunity to inspect the originals. The judge can address that imbalance through restrictions on testimony or an adverse instruction allowing the jury to draw an unfavorable inference under the appropriate findings.

Brown reserves default for bad faith where lesser measures will not suffice. Zubul likewise emphasizes tailoring the remedy and considering alternatives. We can request default and explain why the lost evidence is irreplaceable, but should also request appropriate evidence restrictions and an adverse inference. Because photographs and testing records may remain, a court could reasonably choose those lesser measures instead. A sanctions order would not necessarily settle every question about damages or automatically establish the entire case without further proceedings.

2. A separate action against Advanced Testing

Zubul distinguishes sanctions in the existing action from an independent claim against a nonparty. It does not allow ordinary case sanctions against an unrelated third party merely for spoliation. It does recognize a separate tort where a special relationship or obligation creates a preservation duty and the third party actually knows of the pending or potential action.

Here, Advanced Testing had a contract with Sunrise, but we have no agreement requiring preservation for you. Dr. Stein says Sunrise instead instructed destruction, and the laboratory ordinarily keeps remnants only on special request. The testing contract therefore does not presently establish the particular preservation duty we need. There is also no identified statute, rule, voluntary undertaking, or comparable circumstance imposing such a duty to you.

Actual knowledge is an additional obstacle. Stein says he was not told about the fatal accident and learned of it only weeks before his deposition, after the tests and disposal. The fact that a laboratory tests damaged equipment is not equivalent to actual knowledge of a particular pending or potential suit. Its technical expertise alone cannot replace the knowledge requirement.

We should investigate whether another employee received notice, whether the paperwork mentioned the death or litigation, and whether the laboratory undertook any preservation obligation. On the present evidence, however, an independent claim against Advanced Testing is unlikely to succeed. Our stronger course is to develop Sunrise’s responsibility and request remedies proportionate to the resulting evidentiary harm in your existing case.

Sincerely,
Julie Williams

The signature above belongs to the fictional examination setting and does not identify a real reviewer.

Sources and further comparison

The official question controls its facts and jurisdiction. These responses address the exam scenario; subsequent legal changes and other fact patterns may require a different analysis. The PT uses the supplied fictional Columbia library, which must not be replaced with outside law.