Original sample memorandum of points and authorities
I. The undisputed material evidence establishes that Dahir gratuitously rendered emergency care in good faith within Columbia’s Good Samaritan Act.
A. Summary judgment is proper when the evidence, viewed favorably to Panko, permits no material contrary finding on the immunity requirements.
Chung v. Delva holds that summary judgment is appropriate only where, viewing the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, no genuine issue of material fact remains. A disagreement is material if its resolution could change the result. Chung does not make every Good Samaritan Act claim unsuitable for summary judgment; it expressly recognizes that immunity can be determined on an adequate undisputed record.
Columbia Statute 34-30 protects a person who comes upon an emergency or accident and, in good faith, gratuitously renders emergency care there, subject to the gross-negligence exception. The definition discussed in Chung includes actions the aider reasonably believes necessary to prevent death or serious injury or beneficial to the injured person, provided the aider reasonably believes the action can be successfully undertaken. It considers both the aider’s actual perception and its reasonableness in the entire emergency situation.
B. The damaged van and disoriented occupant supplied an objectively reasonable basis to assess an emergency.
Dahir encountered an upright van in a ditch before sunrise in heavy fog. Its roof, windshield, and hood were heavily damaged, and a man was wandering nearby. An apparent collision had just occurred; another vehicle was leaving as Dahir approached. Dahir thought the man might be injured or drunk. That uncertainty explains why inquiry was needed. The Act does not require a motorist to diagnose an injury from a moving truck before stopping to ask whether assistance is necessary.
Tram’s affidavit confirms disorientation: he describes being in a daze with only snippets of memory. Higgins also saw the damaged work van in the ditch and Tram beside the semi. These circumstances support the reasonableness of perceiving a potential emergency independently of whether Tram could stand or initially answer that he was okay. A person able to walk can still need help after a serious collision.
C. Dahir’s own testimony establishes an actual intention to help and a readily achievable form of assistance, unlike the missing evidence in Chung.
Chung rejects the proposition that immunity begins only after affirmative lifesaving measures. Stopping to assess an apparent accident and determine the need for assistance can itself be emergency care. Its reversal instead rested on a deficient record: the driver gave no direct evidence of his intentions, beliefs, or willingness and ability to assist. The passenger’s inquiry could have accompanied navigation or an involuntary stop in dangerous conditions.
Here, Dahir personally described his observations, the possible injury, his decision to stop, his question whether Tram was okay, and his further offer to call 911. Tram accepted that offer immediately before the collision. This is direct evidence of an intended helpful action, not an observer’s assumption about an unknown driver’s motives. Offering to contact emergency services is a practical step a driver can reasonably believe he can accomplish; no speculative medical procedure or special training was necessary.
Dahir’s failure actually to place the call does not defeat the statutory protection. He testified that Panko struck before there was time, and the stop lasted no more than fifteen to thirty seconds. Higgins likewise describes only seconds before impact. The very assessment and arrangement of further assistance fall within the Act; they do not lose protection because another collision interrupted them.
Neither Higgins nor Panko heard the conversation. Tram remembers speaking with Dahir but cannot recall what either said. Their lack of memory or inability to hear does not affirmatively contradict Dahir’s account. The record contains no testimony that he sought compensation, stopped for an unrelated commercial purpose, or had a preexisting duty to provide these services. His voluntary roadside inquiry and offer support gratuitous assistance in good faith. Unlike Chung, the evidence supplies the missing subjective purpose and the reasonable, limited action intended.
II. Even accepting Panko’s account of the stop, the record permits no finding of the gross negligence necessary to defeat immunity.
A. Miller requires reckless disregard, rather than an imperfect exercise of care.
Miller v. Jones defines gross negligence as a conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of duty and consequences. Ordinary negligence must be accompanied by utter unconcern or the requisite conscious indifference. The distinction concerns the quality of conduct, not merely the seriousness of the injury. Although gross negligence ordinarily presents a factual question, Miller permits resolution as a matter of law where the undisputed facts support only ordinary negligence.
Miller’s driver looked both ways at a stop sign but failed to see another vehicle. That failure supported negligence, but his precautions showed that he did not disregard the duty altogether. The same distinction governs Dahir’s roadside decisions.
B. Dahir’s precautions negate reckless disregard even if the Court assumes that no hazard lights were flashing.
Panko says the semi stopped in the eastbound travel lane in darkness and fog and had no flashing hazards. Dahir acknowledges stopping in the road and is uncertain whether he activated them. The motion therefore should not depend on resolving that point in Dahir’s favor. Even taking Panko’s version as true, the other precautions distinguish imperfect care from utter unconcern.
Dahir drove below the speed limit, checked his mirrors while slowing, and saw no approaching vehicle. He testified that virtually no usable shoulder could accommodate the semi. Panko’s assertion that he should have pulled over identifies a proposed safer course but does not supply evidence that a usable shoulder actually existed. The semi remained within its eastbound lane rather than crossing the center line.
Dahir also kept his foot on the brake so the rear brake lights remained illuminated. Higgins independently saw those lights. He kept the transmission ready to move because he did not yet know what the emergency required and might need to proceed promptly. Those actions show attention to visibility, following traffic, and the ability to clear the area. If the jury could find a better stopping method, that would not by itself establish the conscious indifference Miller requires.
The short interval also matters. This was not an unattended truck abandoned in fog for an extended period. Dahir had only enough time to ask two brief questions before impact. Panko’s own testimony that he saw Tram at the passenger window corroborates the assessment occurring at the scene. The defense need not establish Panko’s comparative fault to obtain statutory immunity, and his failure to brake is not offered as an excuse for reckless conduct by Dahir. Rather, the relevant point is that the established safety measures and brief emergency assessment do not support such a finding in the first place.
C. The light and stopping disputes are insufficient to remove statutory protection.
Panko can dispute ordinary care in stopping in the travel lane without flashing hazards, but ordinary negligence is precisely the category for which the Act limits liability when its assistance requirements are met. Treating every disputed precaution as gross negligence would erase that distinction and discourage the preliminary assessment Chung protects.
The record must still be viewed favorably to Panko, including the darkness, heavy fog, travel-lane stop, and absence of flashing lights. Even with those facts, Dahir’s mirror checks, active brake lights, limited stopping time, and readiness to move show regard for other motorists comparable to the precautions that defeated gross negligence in Miller. Those facts support immunity from the personal-injury claim arising from this emergency assessment and arrangement of assistance, without resolving irrelevant disputes or making a credibility finding about the hazard switch.