A. Season tickets
An attorney may not bargain for a fee contingent on the outcome of a criminal case under either the ABA or California rules. Allison requested season tickets if she prevailed. The condition ties compensation to the result, and calling it a gift does not automatically remove its compensatory character. A valid written retainer does not authorize an additional prohibited contingent arrangement.
The gift-solicitation rules provide another ground. ABA Rule 1.8(c) restricts soliciting a substantial client gift unless the specified family relationship exists; no such relationship is stated. Season tickets for a professional athlete’s games may be substantial, although value must be established rather than assumed merely from the label.
California Rule 1.8.3 restricts inducing a client to make a substantial gift unless the lawyer is related to the client. The wording differs from the ABA’s solicitation prohibition, so the evidence of inducement should be addressed. Here Allison expressly asked her client for a result-linked benefit, strongly supporting concern under the rule if substantial. The criminal contingent-compensation problem remains even if the value does not establish a substantial-gift violation.
B. Payment to Wilfred
Reasonable compensation for a witness’s time, lost earnings, and necessary preparation can be permissible. Paying an hourly amount comparable to Wilfred’s wages and tips is not automatically buying testimony, and the reasonableness of an entire preparation day depends on actual need.
The condition is the problem. Allison made payment depend on Wilfred refusing to meet with the prosecution. ABA Rule 3.4(f) restricts asking a nonclient to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information, subject to narrow relationships not stated here. Paying for that refusal strengthens the violation rather than making it ordinary lost-time compensation.
California’s wording differs: Rule 3.4 prohibits unlawful obstruction of access to witnesses, legally prohibited inducements, and compensation contingent on testimony’s content or the case’s outcome. It does not simply reproduce ABA Rule 3.4(f). The prosecution can argue that purchasing Wilfred’s noncooperation is unlawful obstruction or an improper inducement; Allison can respond that an ordinary witness may decline a voluntary interview and the amount reflects actual lost time. The California conclusion should identify the legal basis making this condition unlawful, rather than assume that any refusal to meet is itself a discovery violation. A duty to comply with a subpoena would present a clearer prohibition, but none is stated. The express payment-for-silence condition creates a serious fairness problem separate from the permissible amount of compensation.
C. Payment to Eileen
An expert may be paid a reasonable hourly fee for actual professional services and testimony. No fact establishes that $500 per hour is excessive for this technician, and hourly payment is not contingent on winning merely because counsel hopes to win.
But Allison agreed to pay only once Eileen agreed to change her opinion to a supposedly exculpatory one. That sequence supports an inference that compensation purchased a predetermined conclusion rather than independent expert work. Both systems prohibit improper inducements and participation in false evidence. The defect is not the rate alone; it is the bargain and knowledge concerning the testimony.
D. Presenting the opinion
Allison and Eileen previously agreed the video strongly showed the assault. An honest expert can revise an opinion after further analysis, but no new technical basis is stated. The agreement to change testimony, coupled with the payment, supports knowledge that the offered explanation was false.
Under Rule 3.3 and the corresponding California rule, Allison may not knowingly offer false evidence or assist a witness to testify falsely. If falsity becomes known after presentation, she must take the applicable reasonable remedial measures. The ABA can require disclosure to the tribunal when necessary despite ordinary Rule 1.6 confidentiality; California’s rule preserves the statutory confidentiality limitation, requiring careful attention to what may be disclosed while still taking permissible remedial steps. She cannot simply leave testimony in place and repeat it in closing because it favors the client.
E. Closing argument
Allison may argue reasonable inferences from the admitted video and insist that the prosecution has not met its burden. Her personal belief about guilt is not admissible evidence and does not relieve the State of proving its case. Rules governing trial advocacy prohibit improper personal opinions or vouching about guilt, credibility, and the justness of the cause.
Stating that, in her own opinion, Davos was not guilty is therefore improper. Arguing that the video shows no assault also violates candor if Allison knows she is presenting a false factual account supported by manufactured expert testimony. These are distinct problems: counsel can advocate an acquittal for a person she privately believes guilty, but cannot supply personal testimony or knowingly falsify the evidentiary basis. Withdrawal, if required, remains subject to court permission and protection of the client; it does not by itself erase the duty to address false evidence already presented.