1. Responsibility for the motion to compel
Both California and ABA rules bind a subordinate lawyer even when acting at a supervisor's direction. A subordinate ordinarily may rely on a supervisor's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty. That principle protects reasonable professional judgment; it does not create a general defense of following orders.
Larry researched a motion to obtain documents Smith claims are trade secrets and believes it will be denied and may generate sanctions. A trade-secret claim does not invariably make discovery unavailable. Relevance, necessity, proportionality, and protective measures can support production under restrictions. Peter's greater experience may allow him to reasonably conclude that a motion has a nonfrivolous basis despite Larry's concern.
The ethical issue is not simply whether Larry expects to win. Lawyers may make good-faith arguments for extending or changing existing law and may pursue reasonably supportable discovery. Larry should discuss the particular grounds and sanctions concern with Peter, review the proposed justification, and ensure the motion is grounded in fact and law rather than intended to harass. If the issue is genuinely arguable and Peter's resolution reasonable, Larry may follow the instruction under the subordinate-lawyer rule.
If instead the research establishes that the motion lacks any nonfrivolous basis or is an abusive tactic, Peter's experience cannot cure it. Larry must refuse to sign or file a paper he knows violates the applicable duties. Federal or state procedural certification and sanctions requirements, if applicable, reinforce his independent responsibility; the question does not establish which court's discovery rule governs. The supplied facts therefore support a conditional answer based on whether Peter reasonably resolves an arguable question, rather than an automatic prohibition on a motion predicted to lose.
2. The damaging responsive document
The second instruction is much clearer. Larry knows the document falls within Smith's request, was not produced, and has no legitimate withholding basis. Peter nevertheless directs hearsay, trade-secret, and overbreadth objections. Larry cannot knowingly advance those grounds as a sham to conceal evidence.
An eventual hearsay objection at trial does not categorically prevent discovery of relevant nonprivileged information. Nor can a lawyer label a document a trade secret without a factual basis or invoke overbreadth to withhold an admittedly responsive unobjectionable item. If a genuine confidentiality issue exists, counsel may seek a protective order or appropriate limitations; none is supplied here. A document's usefulness to the opponent is a reason to comply carefully, not a professional justification for suppression.
Duties of fairness to opposing parties, compliance with lawful discovery, candor, and honesty prohibit obstructing access to evidence and making knowingly improper objections. The supervisory safe harbor does not apply to this clear violation. Larry should explain the obligation to Peter, refuse to participate in baseless withholding, and take reasonable steps through the firm and client to ensure the response is corrected and the document produced as required. If previously served responses are materially incomplete, the applicable supplementation or correction duties also must be addressed.
The document belongs to the client and may contain client information, but the duty of confidentiality does not create a privilege covering all harmful evidence. Larry should proceed through authorized discovery channels and limit disclosure to what lawfully is required. He should not privately leak the file to Smith's counsel under the mistaken view that ethics permits unlimited self-directed disclosure.
If Peter persists, Larry should seek review from another responsible lawyer or firm authority and consider withdrawal if continued participation would violate the rules. Necessary tribunal permission and protection of Jones's interests still apply. Withdrawal alone is not a device to preserve a false representation or avoid any independently required correction. California and ABA confidentiality and remedial duties must be applied to the actual circumstances rather than assuming that every internal disagreement requires a public report.
3. XYZ's employment offer and the current client
XYZ represents Smith against Larry's current client Jones. Negotiating a job with the adversary's law firm may create a significant risk that Larry's professional judgment will be materially limited by his personal interest in obtaining the position. His preparation of discovery responses gives him access to precisely the information the adverse firm would value. He must not soften Jones's defense, conceal responsive evidence to impress anyone, or trade confidential information for an offer.
Receipt of an unsolicited offer does not automatically establish that he has accepted or entered substantive negotiations. Larry should assess the situation promptly. If discussions become sufficiently serious to create a material-limitation risk, he must disclose the conflict to Jones and obtain the required informed consent before continuing affected representation, or arrange an ethically proper removal or withdrawal. California generally requires informed written consent; the ABA requires informed consent confirmed in writing. Consent is available only if the lawyer reasonably can provide competent diligent representation and the other consentability conditions are met.
He should inform the appropriate supervising personnel about the conflict so the firm can protect Jones. That does not require broadcasting every preliminary personal inquiry, but it does require timely management before negotiations impair the work. He cannot assume Peter's approval substitutes for Jones's own informed decision.
4. Confidentiality and duties after a move
Whether or not he accepts, Larry must preserve Jones's confidential information. A job interview does not authorize disclosure of the damaging document, litigation strategy, or other information useful to Smith. Limited information may sometimes be exchanged to detect and resolve conflicts under the governing rules, but that exception does not permit information whose disclosure would prejudice the client or compromise privilege. This live adverse case demands particular restraint.
If Larry joins XYZ, he has personally worked on the same matter for Jones. His former-client duties ordinarily prevent him from switching sides against Jones in this action without the required informed consent. He possesses material confidential information and cannot characterize the matter as unrelated simply because his role changes firms. Conflict imputation to XYZ must also be addressed.
The ABA permits screening in specified lateral-lawyer circumstances with timely isolation, no share of the fee from the matter, and required notices and certifications. California's screening exception has its own conditions and is not an automatic solution where the lawyer substantially participated in the same or a substantially related matter. Larry's work defending this case and preparing discovery responses makes substantial participation a serious obstacle. The answer therefore should not promise that an ethical wall invariably cures the move. Appropriate client consent or declining an incompatible employment arrangement may be necessary. Larry must resolve these issues before accepting work that exposes Jones's representation to divided loyalty or its information to adverse use.